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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
8NARR ADVERTISING, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE l~TAH STATE TAX CO~I­
~IISSlON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
10808 
BRIEF O·F DEFENDANT 
STA'J1EMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is before this honorable court on a writ 
of certiorari to review a decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
The soh• issue presented to the court is whether or 
not a sales tax may be appropriately imposed upon re-
ceipts from advertising upon outdoor painted billboards 
and adwrtising signs. 
1 
DISPOSITION BEFOHE THE 
UTAH STATE rrAX CO~IMISSION 
After consideration of all pertinent facts and the 
law, the Utah State Tax Commission on October 25, 196(), 
rendered a decision (R. 204-206) sustaining the deficiency 
assessment (R. 111-198) against Snarr Advertising, Inc. 
The existing controversy between Snarr Advertising, 
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Snarr) and the Utah 
State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
Commission), which arose out of the deficiency assess-
ment above referred to, involves a number of collateral 
problems, some of which are related and some not, in 
addition to the question raised on this appeal. Many 
of these have been satisfactorily resolved in the interim; 
the resolution of others is dependent upon the decision in 
this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's deci-
sion of October 25, 1966, above referred to. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As correctly pointed out in plaintiff's brief, there is 
no substantial controversy as to the facts, but there is 
considerable difference in the interpretation of these 
facts. The question presented to the court for its deter-
mination is admittedly complex and sophisticated, and 
may require some venturing into uncharted waters. Be-
2 
C'aUS<~ of this, and betau::;e the nature of the court's 
d(·ei:sion depends in a large part on how these facts 
arP inteqJl'ded, it is pertinent that they be accurately 
~d forth at the outset. 
Plaintiff'::; brief includes an eight-page summary 
of tltt>se facts as ::;et forth in the record. This summary 
is accurate in most particulars. Because of the tendency 
(perhaps unavoidable) in such an extended narration 
of and eomrnentary on the facts toward some selective 
n'porting, special pleading and other interpretive prac-
tiees which might more appropriately have been included 
in the argument section of the brief, it seems desirable 
to srnrnnarize in this brief also the basic facts as they 
are relevant to this review. 
Snarr Advertising, Inc. advertises for its clientele 
upon painted billboards. These billboards are built, pre-
pan•d and painted by Snarr, sometimes based on sug-
gestions from a particular customer or its advertising 
agPncy, but more often based on original work by Snarr 
approv0d by the customer. (R. 55-58, 66, 77) The land 
npon which a billboard is placed upon completion may 
lwlong to either the advertising agency or the client, but 
ty1Jically belongs to neither of these, but to a third party 
with whom Snarr has entered into a lease for a term 
ePrtain. Snarr may move a given sign from one location 
to another with a comparable exposure factor if the 
elient approves such a move. (R. 41-42) 
It i::; important to note at the outset that Snarr places 
vainted billboards exclusively in this jurisdiction. (R. 64) 
Tlwse are custom-made for a given client and erected 
3 
for a long period, usually three or four years. ( R. 81) 
rrhis is a considerably different factual situation than 
that existing in relation to standard si'.Ze postc>r billboards 
npon which the advertising matter is changed every 
few weeks. The witness from Snarr Advertising, Inc., 
.Mr. Moon, offered no specific testimony as to what per-
centage of the materials going into these billboards is 
ever reused, but the long life of the sign, the practices of 
the business, the specially designed custom shapes of 
many of the signs and other factors suggest that a small 
percentage indeed of the materials is reused in the work 
of another customer once they are put into a billboard 
(R. 82). 
The standard agreement forms used by Snarr in its 
dealings, both with its clients and with lessors of land, 
were introduced into evidence and are part of the record. 
(R. 199-203) ThesP are t~Tiical of similar contracts used 
by others in the industry. An examination of these docu-
ments will reveal that by their terms Snan r<>tains C('l'-
tain rights in and responsibilities for the billboards 
and that the client obtains certain rights in and responsi-
bilities for the billboards. What some of these are, and 
their legal significance, will be explored in the body of 
this brief. 
Also in the record (R. 10-12) is a stipulation of facts 
entered into between the parties, setting forth in some 
detail the nature and history of this action. 
Those parts of the record which are excerpted and 
commented on in plaintiff's brief on pages 5-9 will also 
be dealt with in the argument section of this brief. 
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::)ome olrnervations would seem appropriate in rch-
tion to th<' d<>ei,.,ion of the Commission, which is subjected 
to somt' buffetings on pages 9-10 and 18-20 of plaintiff's 
11rief. lt is respectfully submitted that the findings of 
fad and conclusions of law set forth in the Commission's 
deeision are entirely adequate, and are amply supported 
hy the record and each other. It is true that some of 
the conclusions of law are really mixed questions of lm',' 
and fact, since they express the Commission's determina-
tion as to the ultimate facts of this controversy, and 
frame these in the applicable statutory language. In 
this intricate problem a clean delineation between law and 
fact is neither possible nor desirable, and while it is 
obvious that some of these conclusions of law might have 
bPPn repeated verbatim or with minute modification in 
the findings of fact section, it is submitted that little 
ronstructlon would have been accomplished thereby; and 
further, that the Commission's findings and conclusions 
an_. altop:Ptlter appropriate and sufficient. See Meeker v. 
l.rhigh Valley R. R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 35 Sup.Ct. 328, 
G2 L.Ed. G-±4 (1915). 
As is stated in the standard work on the subject, 
Prof. Davis' definite AdminiBtrative Law Treatise, Vol. 
'.!, ~ lG.OG (1958): 
Courts do not want agencies to include detailed 
~urnmariPs of tPstimony in tlwir findings, they 
\\-ant -wlrnt th<>Y call the basic facts. The ultimate 
finding may l;e and nsnally is mixed with ideas 
of law or policy. Tlw Suprenw Court has said: 
''ThP ultimatP finding is a conclusion of law or 
at l<'ast a delineation of a mixed question of law 
and fact." H elcninq r. Tr.r-Pem1 Oil Co., 300 U.S. 
-!-81, -191, 52 S. Ct. 569, 574, 81 L.Ed. 755 ( 1937). 
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Some jurisdictions by statute impo:,;e express bur-
dens on administrative agencies to 111ake particular find-
ings, or to issue their findings in a particular format. 
Ptah is not such a jurisdiction. 
Nor is it a jurisdiction that restricts narrowly the 
scope of review of the Supreme Court of decisions of 
administrative agencies. Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-1-l: 
( 1963) specifically states (as noted on page 18 of plain-
tiff's brief) that "the decision of the Tax Commission 
may be reviewed both upon the la\\' and upon the facts." 
This does not disturb or negate the function of the 'I1ax 
Commission as a finder of facts, whose findings will not 
be lightly overturned. As stated in M cf( e11drick v. State 
Tax Comm'11., 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (19-19): 
On the hasis of tlw fignr<'s al1un' discussed the 
Commission concluded that tlw plaintiff's bnsi1wss 
is essentially that of s<>lling iwn;onal pro1wrty, 
and regarded the ]Jersonal :,;<·rvie<'s rernlPrPd as 
merely ineidental tlwreto. Notwithstanding the 
fact the statute providing for review by this court 
of decisions of the tax commission allows it to be 
made "both upon the law and the facts,'' we 
nevertheless allow eonsiderahle latitudP to tlw de-
termination mad(e b~T tlw 'rax Commission and do 
not disturb it unh•ss it is dt-arly enoneous. West-
ern Leather & Fi11di11q Co. v. State Tax Comm'11, 
87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526. 
This is, however, a quite different climate than that 
found when the review court is bound by and cannot 
overturn factual findings made by a given administrative 
body, as is true with some federal agenci<>s. 
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The instant ease is unlike those where appellate 
eourts havP had to remit a record to a commission for 
more detailed, more precise or better organized findings. 
Those have typically been cases where a specific statutory 
bnrden is imposed or where the record is so extensive 
as to impose an unconscionable burden upon a reviewing 
tribunal in determining whether or not the record sup-
ports the decision of the agency. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision is in 
every particular adequate and that the record, albeit 
snbjeet to a number of interpretations, supports the Com-
mission's decision. While plaintiff suggests that the 
Commission erred or was at least less than thorough in 
that it "did not list its reasons, its theories or its interpre-
tations or analyses of the facts" in its formal decision, 
we would stress that theories, interpretations, analyses, 
etc. involve argument as well as facts and law, and should 
not he included in a formal decision of the type utilized 
by the Commission disguised as pure fact or law, but 
would be most appropriately presented to a reviewing 
court in the body of a brief, as will be the case in this 
controversy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PAINTED BILLBOARDS INVOLVED IN THIS 
CONTROVERSY ARE TANGIBLE PERS 0 NA L 
PROPERTY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF UT AH 
CODE ANN.§ 59-15-2(g) (1963). 
Utah CodE~ Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963), the statute 
uncfor whirh liability is asserted, provides as follows: 
vVhen right to continuous posst>ssion or use of 
any article of tangible personal property is 
7 
granted under a lease or eontract and such trans-
fer of possession would he taxahle if an outright 
sale ·were made, such lease or contract shall he 
considered the sale of such article and the tax 
shall be computed and paid by the vendor or 
lessor upon the rentals paid. 
The kind of statute of which this is a prototype had 
its origin primarily in a legislative reaction against the 
practice, at one time extensive, of using leases and similar 
agreements as a means of excise tax avoidance. Many 
states now have statutory provisions purporting to accom-
plish the same thing as Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) 
( 1963), but the language of these statutes and the manner 
in which courts have interpreted them vary considerably 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This plurality of evolu-
tion divests cases from other states construing these 
statutes of some of the persuasive value they might 
otherwise have. 
Since our statute requires the right to continuous 
possession or the right to continuous use of tangible 
personal property as a condition of tax imposition, it 
'lvould be appropriate to initially determine whether or 
not tangible personal property is involved within the 
purview of this language. Plaintiff, while conceding the 
obvious, that the painted billboards involved are tangible 
personal property, has taken the position that since it 
considers, and its customers consider, its business to be 
that of furnishing a service rather than that of marketing 
personalty, the fact that the billboards are tangible per-
sonal property is not significant since the service is 
non-taxable and the proprrties furnished to plaintiff's 
clients are simply incidental to such service. 
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One of the most frequently litigated of sales tax 
qnestions is that concerning the appropriateness for tax 
imposition of a transaction involving both a service and 
property. The volume of suits in this area is not surpris-
ing, since almost every service rendered involves the 
transfer or use of some tangible property and almost 
every sale of property involves directly or indirectly 
some service or other value not inherent in the substance 
itself added by a service. 
Even in the fields where an apparently pure "serv-
ice'' is involved, such as those of a broker, clergyman, 
lawyer, minister, analyst, or travel agent, the rendering 
of the service very often involves the transfer of use of 
some property, albeit usually of nominal value. On the 
other extreme, even the outright sale of a commodity 
in a retail merchandising establishment almost always 
involveti some service, and not just that of sales person-
nel but often those of accountants, deliverymen, pack-
agers, and (almost without exception) fabricators of 
the article sold from its constituent substances. In be-
t ween these examples are many in which the value and 
importance of the service rendered and of the commodity 
furnished are relatively equal. 
Some administrators and courts have attempted to 
solve the dilemma of which of these transactions should 
he and which should not be subject to excise tax imposi-
tion by attempting to prorate the relative values of the 
commodity and the service involved. A far more rational 
approach, however, is that reflected in the case of 111 c-
l\ endrick v. State Tax Comm'n, supra. The question 
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there presented was whether a sales tax applies to sales 
of artificial limbs. The court held the sale of such limbs 
taxable, against the contention that the material included 
in these prosthetic devices was of nominal value when 
compared with the worth of the work and :service that 
went into their preparation, under the theory that "by 
far the greater part of the skill and labor in creating 
artificial limbs is done prior to the sale, so that it has 
then acquired the value created by such skill and labor." 
Chief Justice J. Allan Crockett, speaking for the court, 
elaborated upon this principle in the following language, 
particularly apropos to the instant controversy: 
It is quit<> gt>rn•rall:v tnw that "uiatniab, '' con-
sidered separate and apart frorn "s(•rvicPst are 
not worth much. The value of raw materials 
depend:s upon their abundance or scan·it~-. It is 
usually very small in comparison to thP procluds 
into which tlH>y are fashioned. It is the taking 
of ore from the mine or the tree from the forest 
and fabricating them into something useful which 
makes the end product desirahlP and therefore 
valuable. During the process of transformation 
through various stage's tlw vahw is sh•adily en-
hanced in proportion to the ex1wncliture of time, 
energy and :skill then-'on. An PXCPll<·nt if somP-
what exaggprafod exam11le of this is the process 
by which a pound of ore, worth hut a frw cents, 
is mined, smelted, processed, h•mpered and fabri-
cated into hair springs for watdws ·worth thous-
ands of dollars pPr pound. \Ylwn onP is sold its 
value is that of the finished product and not of 
the basic materials from which it was made. While 
less marked in dPgn•p the smrn• principle applies 
to the plaintiff's product. 
... the exact allocation of the cost of lahor and 
materials is not controlling. It i:s the synthesis 
10 
of both in the finished product which determines 
its sales value. 
The p1'inciple here elucidated should govern in this case. 
In the final analysis, whatever ''service" Snarr renders 
to its customers goes into the painted billboards and 
whatever value such services might have are absorbed by 
and exist only in relation to the billboards. The service 
is not rendered in a vacuum, nor at all apart from the 
tangible property involved. Without a billboard there is 
no value received for which the client could be billed. 
This principle might be further illustrated by exam-
ination of a restaurant operation. A breakdown of the 
vrice of a meal to determine what part of the price 
covt:'red the foodstuffs themselves and what part re-
flected such "serviees" as procuring the food, cooking 
and preparation, serving the meal, cleaning and mainte-
nance, managing the establishment, etc., would almost in-
v:wiably show that these latter charges account for the 
major portion of the charge to the customer. Particularly 
would this be true in more exclusive, higher priced estab-
lishments. It could not be suggested however, that be-
eause of the fact that these "services" represent the lion's 
8hare of the price, that such services rather than the 
JH'oduct is really what the customer is paying for or 
that the meal is furnished incidental to the "services" 
or that a sales tax on the whole charge for the meal would 
he inappropriate. Whatever value these services have are 
absorbed into the final product; i.e., the served meal, and 
the services have no value whatever to the customer 
separate and apart from this meal. 
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At the risk of redundancy and in hope of bringing 
the point into yet clearer focus, we off er an even more 
extreme example. If X purchases from Y, a licensed 
art dealer, an original Cezanne landscape for $250,000, 
would it not verge upon the absurd for X to point out 
that the canvas, paint and other substances which make 
up the painting are really worth only $8.35, the balance 
representing "artistic services" (plaintiff's brief, page 
33), and that, therefore, he should pay a sales tax upon 
only $8.35, if at all~ 
Other examples were cited during the course of the 
proceedings before the Tax Commission of products 
whose fair market value is so much in excess of the 
market value of the separate components of such prod-
uct as to have no apparent relation whatsoever. Plain-
tiff has promised on page 33 of his brief that many 
of these hypotheticals will be employed in this brief 
and we would, therefore, be hesitant to omit them. 
Some of these products (there are many others as well) 
are drugs, phonograph records, patented equipment, 
antiques, cosmetics, rare stamps and coins, and first 
edition books. If any of these items were sold there can 
be no doubt that an excise tax would be appropriately 
imposed upon the full consideration furnished. 
Another example of this concept, and one from a 
case which we respectfully submit as controlling, is found 
in Young Electric Sign Co. v. State Tax Cormn'n, 4 Utah 
2d 242, 291 P. 2d 900 (1955), to which extensive reference 
will be subsequently made. Young Electric Sign Com-
12 
pany entered into two types of contracts with its custo-
mers. In one type of transaction, called "repair sales," 
Young simply repaired electric signs already in the pos-
S(·ssion of its customers and incident to such repair 
furnished tangible personal property amounting to about 
six percent of the total repair bill. The court held sales 
tax imposition inappropriate. It might be noted in pass-
ing that subsequent to the Y oimg Electric Sign case the 
Legislature (in 1959) enacted Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-
4 ( e), which would probably lead to a contrary holding 
should the same matter be brought before the court at 
this time; this point is, however, peripheral to our present 
mqmry. 
In the other transactions the company prepared neon 
signs, which it installed according to its agreements with 
its clients. These signs usually identified the business 
premises in question. This fact cannot, however, be 
ascertained from reading the opinion and we would sug-
gest that it is not legally significant whether identifica-
tion or advertising is involved. These rental contracts 
included a charge for maintenance. There is no precise 
breakdown on the percentages of materials and service 
values involved in the case; the statement in plaintiff's 
brief (page 31) that the percentage of materials was 
fifty percent defines the outside limit; the language of 
the case is "over fifty percent of the receipts is for 
service and maintenance." Young Electric Sign Co. v. 
State Tax Comm 'n, supra. The court upheld a sales tax 
imposition on the entire value of these rental contracts, 
saying that "what elements enter into charges for these 
nmtals can be of no materiality." 
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Plaintiff makes a valiant attempt to explain away 
this language; we would submit, however, that it means 
what it says, and that what it says is the same thing 
as the McKendrick case, the court's most recent utter-
ance on the subject, says. 
Another case which has been important in the evolu-
tion of this law in Utah is the case of liVestern Leather 
& Finding Co. v. State T.a·x Conini'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 
P. 2d 526 ( 1935). In this case the eourt held that the 
wearer of shoes which had been repaired is the ultimate 
consumer of these repaired shoes, and that a sales tax 
appropriately lies on the full cost of the repairs which 
included about thirty percent materials value and seventy 
percent labor and service charge. The force of this case 
is somewhat mitigated, however, by ambiguities therein 
and by the fact that its basic concern was ·with wholesale-
retail distinctions and the questions of ultimate consumer 
and its consideration of the problem before the court 
now only tangental. 
Cases from other jurisdictions support the M cK en.-
drick doctrine. Particularly interesting is the California 
case of Bigsby v. Johnson, 99 P. 2d 268 (Cal. 1940), 
·which involved the sales of printers mats and composi-
tion, and in which the costs of skills and services account 
for over ninety percent of the charge made to clients. 
The court found a sales tax on the full charge appropri-
ate, citing the case of Cus'ick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 
204, 84 S. W. 2d 14 ( 1935), for the proposition that "the 
chief value of many articles consists in the cost of the 
service and the skill by which tlwy are produced rather 
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than the cost of materials out of which they are made." 
The Cusick case involved a number of custom-made 
items of merchandise. In People ex rel Walker Engrav-
1119 Co. v. Groves, 243 App. Div. 652, 276 N.Y.S. 67±, 
Aff. 268 N.Y. 6-18, 198 N.1£. 539 (1935), a sales tax was 
upheld upon the full cost of photo engravings when the 
worth of component materials came to less than two 
iwreent of tlw total charge. A similar result was reached 
in relation to the preparation and sale of films in District 
of Columuia v. Norwood, 336 F. 2d 7-16 (1964). State 
1'aJ,' Comm'n v. Hopkins, 234 Ala. 556, 176 So. 210 (1937), 
which relied upon Western Leather & Finding Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, supra, involved eye glasses which 
were sold for an amount five times the value of com-
vonrn t materials. Determining a sales tax imposition 
appropriate on the total charge, the court said that "the 
test a::; to the application and validity of the tax in such 
eas('s is not the relative value of the materials and serv-
iees, but the nature and character of the process, activi-
ti e::;, or manufacture required or employed." 
On pages 32 and 33 of its brief, plaintiff attempts 
to distinguish the instant case from the McKendrick case. 
\Y l~ "·oul<l suggest that these purported distinctions are 
fragile indeed, and that part of page 33 wherein it is 
suggested (if we interpret the text correctly) that the 
artistic concept, locating of the billboard, maintenance of 
th0 billboard and lighting are severable from and not 
represented in the value of the finished product, or do 
not "C'nhance" the structure, particularly tenuous. 
Another dimension of this problem presents itself, 
the question of whether or not a charge may be broken 
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down and a tax applied only to the value of the product 
a.s opposed to the value of the service. Courts have some-
times allowed this type of segregation where the custo-
mers have been billed separately for the materials and 
services, particularly when each of these could be pur-
chased independently, but where, as in the Young Electric 
Sign case, the vendor has for purpose seeming to him 
good and sufficient not broken down the billing, such 
a proration has been consistently disallowed. In the in-
stant case, even though evidence has been introduced pur-
porting to show the value of the tangible parts of the 
structure to be about fifteen percent of the total charge 
to the customer (R. 72), the customer receives no segre-
gated invoice showing that proration. 
In a separate opinion in the Y.oung Electric Sign 
case, Chief Justice J. Allan Crockett incisively illustrates 
the pitfalls of proration without an actual breakdown in 
the billing to the customer. When a single charge is made 
for both materials and services, and they are never 
separately sold, what, in fact, is the charge to the custo-
mers for the materials 1 Surely the vendor cannot simply 
pass on his charge; he is entitled to a profit on the 
materials ... but how much of a profit 1 To attempt to 
figure out prorations and breakdowns for sales tax im-
position in situations of this type would be to open a 
Pandora's box, and the consistent refusal of tax admin-
istrators and courts to get involved in this type of thing 
is understandable. 
The particular contracts (called "agrePments'') here 
involved off er no breakdown of costs, and, indeed, no 
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l'(•frn•nce to salc~s services, artistic services, etc., but 
speak simply of preparation of "outdoor advertising 
displays.'' The agreements are written in a neuter termi-
nology, and words which carry legal connotations which 
rn ight be helvful to resolution of this problem, such aR 
"~ale," '·lease," and "service" have been carefully 
avoided. 
Of particular interest in the evidence presented (R. 
85-86) are statements which establish that a client of 
Snarr will be charged an identical amount whether or not 
lw furnishes the original advertising idea or even pre-
] irninary sketches of the display. \Ve would respectfully 
suggest that this fact is less than consistent with plain-
tiff's claim that one of the most valuable services it per-
forms, and one for which its customers are billed, is in the 
area of advertising idea formulation and conceptualiza-
tion ("arfo;tic service"). If the price to the client is iden-
tical whether or not these services are rendered, the pre-
cision of plaintiff's cost analysis is suspect. It is obvious 
that the amount paid by a customer is greatly in excess of 
the cost of the component materials, but this cuts both 
ways since "the sign itself was paid for during the term 
of tlw agreement" (plaintiff's brief, page 30), which gives 
tlie transaction the earmarks of an actual sale. 
In consistently referring to those with whom it does 
business as "clients" rather than "customers" Snarr 
attempts to connote a service rather than a sales rela-
tionship. ·we suggest that this is a semantic game, 
altering in no particular the realities of the transactions. 
Tn Utah Atty. Gen. Op. No. 58-044, May 28, 1958, the 
Attorn('Y General of the State of Utah examined a prob-
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lem closely akin to the instant questions and ruled that 
·where a product has both a tangible and an intangible 
value, a sales tax upon the total price of the product 
must lie. 
The conclusion herein urged, that the painted bill-
boards are tangible property, and that if a tax is due 
at all it is due upon the total charge, is consistent with 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-2( d) (1963), in the comple-
mentary Use Tax Act, which states that " 'Sales price' 
means the total cash sum for which tangible personal 
property is sold, including any services that are a part 
of the sale . ... " (Emphasis added.) 
In that part of the statement of facts in plaintiff's 
brief entitled "the nature of the plaintiff's business" and 
in Point III argument is advanced that since what the 
clients of Snarr really pay for are exposure of their 
product and since this exposure or value is comparable 
no matter what particular type of advertising media is 
used, the tax consequences of the use of the various 
advertising media must of necessity be similar or even 
identical. 
We would submit that this suggestion is fallacious 
because the tax is imposed not upon coverage or exposure 
but upon the right to continuous possession or use of an 
article of tangible personal property which might be 
enjoyed by a person in connection with such coverage or 
exposure. 
By way of analogy, suppose a person of considerable 
means had invested in the following in an attempt to 
increase his capital: 
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1. Tax exempt municipal bonds issued by the 
City Commission of Omaha, Nebraska; 
2. Five thousand shan's of common stock of 
Polaroid Company; 
3. Valuable original paintings of Dega and 
::\Tiro; 
-+. Two duplexes in Denvt'r, Colorado, leased to 
two families on short term leases; 
5. A number of second mortgages on homes in a 
subdivision in ,Jefferson City, Missouri; 
G. Partnership in a hardware store in \Vauke-
gan, Illinois; 
7. Unmounted sapphires, emeralds and dia-
monds; 
8. Unpatented uranium mining claims located in 
San Juan County, State of Utah, operated 
by an agent; 
9. A copyright on a popular novel; 
10. Unimproved realty in the Yukon. 
It is obvious that even though the purpose of all 
these investments is identical - to effect a financial 
appreciation or gain in net worth - the ad valorem, 
income and excise tax ramifications of the investments 
would vary enormously. 
The same principle is applicable here. The mere 
fact that a client might derive substantially the same 
benefit, in terms of professional jargon, from the use 
of such media as newsprint, billboards, bumper stickers, 
and the airwaves does not necessarily imply the existence, 
or even the desirability, of a unitary taxing scheme upon 
all such uses. The evidence introduced supports this 
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proposition, since it was admitted by plaintiff's witnesses 
(R. 58-60) that certain articles used in novelty or "gim-
mick'' advertising are proper subjects for sales or use 
tax imposition, even though their use brings a comparable 
exposure benefit to that which would be realized through 
another device or approach, such as a radio commercial, 
which clearly would not be subject to taxation. Of neces-
sity, there will be an enormous variance in tax conse-
quences resulting from use of different media, and these 
differences would be factors in the selection by agency 
and customer of one medium over another. 
That there are significant differences between TV 
and radio advertising, periodical advertising, and bill-
boards is apparent. Newspapers go out by the hundreds 
all over the valley, and any assertion of a right of pos-
session or use over a whole edition would be suspect. 
lT se of the airwaves need not directly involve tangible 
personal property at all. Only a billboard exists at a 
given and identifiable point in time and space, with the 
possibility of a continuous exercise of possession or con-
trol over it, or of a continuous use of it. 
We would, therefore, suggest that all parts of plain-
tiff's brief which dwell upon advertising concepts and 
terminology, interesting and informative though they 
may be, are hardly relevant to this inquiry. It is not the 
advertising service or end upon which the tax is being 
proposed, but the means employed to attain such an 
end. If in providing advertising for its clientele, plain-
tiff enters into an agreement by which there is created 
a right to possession or use in a client that is within the 
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imrview of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963) a sales 
tax will appropriately lie; if not, no tax will lie. 
Plaintiff urges that were this tribunal to sustain 
the decision of the Commission an unconscionable dis-
crirnina ti on within the industry would follow. vVe would 
suggest that this is not necessarily so, and further that 
an adoption of plaintiff's position would itself result 
in a somewhat insidious discrimination. Suppose X and 
Y each buy or lease a billboard, X for advertising and Y 
for some other purpose. Plaintiff's position would result 
in taxing Y and not X, even though their purchases were 
identical. This would result in an abandonment of the 
traditional statutory test of the nature of the transaction 
and substitute for it one where taxation or non-taxation 
would depend upon the purchaser's subjective intention 
as to possible subsequent use of the property. 
Nor does the fact that a product might be worth 
more at one time than another time, or in one place than 
another, necessarily argue for special sales tax treatment. 
1 ndeed, this is not uncommon in typical retail operation; 
the price of a product is affected continually by such 
factors as supply and demand, season, distance of retail 
outlets from source, etc. 
It is in the above frame of reference that Sales Tax 
Hegulation No. 65 must be examined, which provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Adwrtising space sold in newspapers, magazines 
or otherwist' is not subject to tax. Likewise, 
charges made hy advertising agencies for prepar-
ing and placing advertising media are charges for 
service, and, therefore, are not taxable. 
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Plaintiff has urged that the inclusion of the phntsP 
''or otherwise" in this language brings billboard advertis-
ing within the purview of the regulation. vVe respectfully 
submit that under accepted principles of statutory con-
struction, which are applicable to regulatory language as 
'vell, a narrower inte11)retation is clearly to be pref e1Ted. 
Applicable is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which 
provides that where general words follow an enumeration 
of specific words, the general words are not to be con-
strued in their widest extent, but are to be interpreted 
as applying only to that type of persons or things spe-
cifically mentioned in the preceding particular enumera-
tion. Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir. 
1930). Since newspapers and magazines are here spe-
cifically listed, the proper interpretation of the sentence 
would be to limit the exemption to periodicals. Snarr's 
reference in its brief (page 17) to the "cryptic" doctrine 
of ejusdem gcneris suggests dissatisfaction with the doc-
trine per se and does not negate its logical and obvious 
appropriateness to the regulatory language above quoted. 
Other ramifications of the regulatory language above 
set forth will be explored in Point III of this brief. 
POJS'l' II 
THE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN SN ARR ADVER-
TISING, INC. AND ITS CUSTOMERS CREATE IN 
THESE CUSTOMERS A TAXABLE RIGHT OF CON-
TINUOUS POSSESSION AND A TAXABLE RIGHT 
OF CONTINUOUS USE UNDER THE TERMS OF 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 59-15-2(g) (196~i). 
In the first point of this brief that part of the lan-
guage of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963) dealing 
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with tangible personal property was explored. In this 
point the remainder of the statutory language of that 
provision will be examined. 
It should be stressed that incidence of tax imposed 
by Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g) (1963) falls upon the 
right of possession or use granted by the lease or con-
tract, rather than upon any actual possession or use. If 
the agreement entered into grants to the lessee the 
right to possess or use certain tangible personal property, 
it is irrelevant and academic to inquire as to what degree 
:such right was exercised, if, indeed, it was exercised at 
all. It was unnecessary for the Commission, therefore, to 
look behind the contracts entered into by Snarr to de-
termine the extent of the user or non-user of the tangible 
personal property involved. 
The phrase "continuous possession or use" is of 
obvious significance in this statute, since any attempted 
imposition of tax thereunder will succeed only when a 
party has either the right to continuous possession or (in 
the alternative) the right to continuous use. Although the 
phrase appears to be less than precise, sufficient judicial 
construction has been given it and its component words 
to give it an explicit and intelligible meaning. 
Antonelli v. Board of Commissioners, City of New-
ark, 128 N.J.L. 531, 27 Atl. 2d 12 (1942), adopted the 
Funk and \Vagnalls Co. dictionary definition of contin-
uous as "connected, extended or prolonged without sep-
aration or interruption of sequence, unbroken and unin-
terrupted and intermittent." In Hode v. Sanford, 101 F. 
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2d 290 (5th Cir. 1939), continuous is defined as "without 
break, cessation or interruption." Otlwr cases have sim-
ilar definitions. See T7. S. c. Fit.q)((tricl.-, G~ F. 2d 5G2 
(10th Cir. 1933) and Kinna 1.:. Norton, 102 S. 2d 653 
(Fla. App. 1958). By regulation, the State of Kansas, 
which has identical statutory language [~ 69-3602(1) 
Kansas Statutes Annotated 196-1] has defowd contin-
uous possession in a manner that is particularly helpful 
in a statutory context substantially identical to our own: 
"continuous possession is deemed to be that possession 
which is uninterrupted for the period of the oral or 
written contract.'' 
In Pa1nhandle & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hoffman, 250 S.W. 
246 (Tex. 1923), continuous possession was held synon-
ymous with "unbroken" possession. A similar result was 
reached in Hitchens v. Milner Land, Coal & Toi~msite Co., 
65 Colo. 597, 178 Pac. 575 (1919), where a party was held 
to have "continuous" possession of a water right even 
though he used it only certain months of the year. 
The principal difficulty with this type of statutory 
language is one of time - how long an uninterrupted 
use should be required to justify tax imposition~ Such 
terms as "prolonged" and "extended" suggested by plain-
tiff at the hearing help little since they are vague and 
imprecise and derive their meaning only from context. 
For example, an 11-hour s1wech would be a prolonged 
speech, but an 11-hour war ·would not be a prolonged war. 
Similarly, if a person held his breath for 3 minutes, he 
would hold it for an extended period, but a walk of a 3-
minute duration would not be an extended walk. Thus, it is 
impossible to pin down from the statutory language an 
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exact time that a lessee must have the right of continuous 
possession or use of a particular property. Often, how-
ever, a reasonable time period is implied, and courts have 
refused to impose liability under statutes similar to ours 
when short term leases were involved. The leading case 
reflecting this approach is Herbertsen v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 
27-1, 170 P. 2d 531, 172 A.L.R. 1312 (194G), which is par-
ticularly helpful because the Colorado statute is identical 
to that of this jurisdiction. See also U-Drive-Em Service 
Co. v. State, 205 Ark. 501, 169 S.W. 2d 584 (1943), and 
lliontgornery Aviation v. State of Alabama, 154 So. 2d 
2~l (Ala. 1963). The Herbertsen and U-Drive-Em cases 
involved automobile rentals, while the Montgomery case 
involved airplane leases under a statute at substantial 
variance with our own. 
There is an excellent guideline as to a time require-
ment in Utah in the Young Electric Sign case, where this 
tribunal had no difficulty in determining that a three-
year lease was of sufficient duration to impose liability. 
Since the leases entered into by Snarr are for a com-
parable period, we respectfully submit that the time re-
quirement in the instant case should create no problem, 
and that if the court finds a right to possession or use, 
then such possession or use is clearly "continuous." 
Is there a possession in the lessee in the instant 
situation? Some of the incidents of ownership, such as 
the right to remove or replace the sign, clearly remain in 
the lessor. Others, such as the right to require change in 
the copy, and aU of the benefits of the billboard, accrue 
to the lessee. His product or service, and solely his prod-
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net or service, is brought to the attention of the public. 
The property is being used not only in his interest but 
also to a large degree at his direction. Other rights are 
in a third party, the fee owner of the realty in question. 
vVe would suggest that the rights, interests and obliga-
tions existing in the lessee in the instant situation are 
not dissimilar in nature or markedly less in degree than 
in some of the classic "sales in disguise" cases. 
It is clear that one can "possess" property with rights 
of ownership, use and dominion and still recognize rights 
in others in relation to the property possessed. Ex-
amples: one may possess an automobile or an appliance 
which is subject to repossession; one may possess a herd 
of cattle subject to control and regulation by the Agri-
('Ulture Department; one may possess realty and recog-
nize in others mineral rights or easements in such realty. 
Similarly, one may possess a painted billboard, but recog-
nize the responsibility in others to maintain and care for 
it and the right in others to move or replace it. 
In addition to actual possession, there is a type of 
possession known as constructive possession. This exists 
"\vhen a person lacks physical possession of a piece of 
property, but has control over and use of the property 
to the degree that he may be said to have "possession of 
the property for all intents and purposes, even though 
physical possession be in another." Baragiano v. Villani, 
117 Ill. App. 372 (190-1,): Brown u. Folkening, 64 N.Y. 
76 (1876). In The Ocemrn, 233 Fed. 139 (D.C.N.Y. 1916), 
possession is simply defined as the 1·i~ht to enJOY the 
liroperty. 
26 
Snarr's brief places considerable emphasis upon the 
understanding of the billboard lessees that they acquire 
no possessory or proprietary interest through the con-
tracts. It is true that the understanding of the parties 
might be extremely significant should litigation develop 
between such parties in relation to such an agreement, 
or should a third party assert some right or privilege 
under the terms of the agreement, but the subjective opin-
ions of the parties are not of cardinal significance in a 
determination of asserted tax liability as against a sov-
ereign who is neither a party to the contract nor, in any 
real sense, a third party beneficiary. ~What is significant, 
and what the court must ascertain, is the actual relation-
ship existing between the parties and the actual rights 
they have in the property concerned - the objective facts 
m: they exist, even if inconsistent with the understanding 
of the parties as to those facts. Particularly is this true 
if this "understanding" would benefit the parties at the 
(·xpense of another not privy to the agreement. 
It is true that in contracts parties may use words 
in just about any sense they see fit, and some interpre-
tation of contracts have been sustained which seem ex-
ceedingly bizarre when it has been properly shown that 
the interpretation upheld was that intended by the par-
ties. However, these cannot be used to the detriment of 
a party not privy, particularly a soverign asserting tax 
liability. 
The reference to horses and cows on page 15 of 
plaintiff's brief refers to an example, admittedly reduc-
tio ad absurdum, which was offered to illustrate the 
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prnposition abon" set forth at the hearing before the 
Commission. If jurisdiction X had a transfer tax on 
rows but not on horses, and in this jurisdiction A and B 
entered into an agreement by which a cow was sold, 
A and B could not avoid the transfer tax on cows by 
agreeing in writing that the animal being sold was in 
fact a horse. A court would look behind the written word 
and examine the realities of the transaction, and dis-
regard when necessary the partisan assertions of those 
who would profit materially from a given interpretation. 
Similarly, in the instant case any interpretation of the 
agreements here pertinent by individuals in the advertis-
ing field must be looked at with a keen awareness of the 
fact that they are not disinterested parties above the 
battle, but stand to gain directly and extensively by a 
ruling against tax imposition in the instant case. It is 
not an adverse reflection on either the integrity or intelli-
gence of these witnesses, but merely a comment on their 
humanity, to suggest respectfully that their testimony, 
and particularly that part which could be considered 
expressions of an opinion rather than recitations of fact, 
must be to a certain extent discounted. The Commission 
listened to the testimony in the record, considered it 
carefully and at great length, and determined in its 
capacity as a finder of fact that the clients of Snarr 
have the right to continuous possession of the billboards 
in question. We submit that this determination was equit-
able, reasonable, according to law and should be affirmed. 
Also relevant here is the principle of law that con-
tracts in which the public interest is involved shall he 
construed in that manner most favorable to the sovereign 
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and the public. McCullough i:. Board of Park Commis-
sioners of Minneapolis, 157 Minn. 278, 195 N.\V. 1013 
(1923); Larson v. South Dakota, 49 Sup. Ct. 196, 278 
U.S. ±29, 73 L.Ed. 441 (1929). 
A little more difficult to deal with than the word 
"possession" in this statute is the word "use" because of 
the paucity of judicial construction of it. There is some 
language that would be instructive in relation to its 
meaning and context, however. For example, Bryson v. 
Hicks, 78 Ind. App. 111, 134 N.E. 874 (1922) ruled that 
if one has use of a thing, one enjoys, holds, or occupies 
it in some manner or has a benefit from it. Use has also 
been defined as "usefulness, utility, advantage, produc-
tive of benefit." National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 
420, 121 S.E. 291, 36 A.L.R. 1171 (1924). 
Counsel for plaintiff in his brief (page 17) attempts 
to simply read the word "use" out of the statute, relying 
upon the New York case of Howitt 11• Street & Smith 
Publications, 276 N.Y. 345, 12 N.E. 435 (1938). This case 
involved short term leasing of certain paintings for dupli-
cation under a statute with language differing signif-
icantly from our own. The court, in a narrow holding, 
confined to the facts of the case and contrary to an 
existing regulation, ruled that no tax was due. The opin-
ion states that "taxing statutes must be given a practical 
construction," and the language in the case strongly sug-
gests that this practical approach was resorted to in 
order to avoid what the justices apparently (and probably 
correctly) felt would have been an undesirable result. 
~We would submit that the Howitt case, based upon neither 
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imrticularly good law nor particularly good logic, cannot 
have any persuasive value before this court. 
One of the fundamental rules of statutory construc-
tion is that effect must be given to every word and phrase 
in a statute, and that nothing is meaningless or without 
effect. 2 Sutherland, Statidory Construction, 3d Ed., 
§ 4705 (1943). There is an abundance of case law in this 
jurisdiction supporting this proposition. Stevenson v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P. 2d 341 (1957); 
State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 36-1 P. 2d 1019 (1961); 
vValker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 23-l F.Supp. 7+ 
(1964); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P. 2d 
984 ( 1965). "Use,'' therefore, does not mean the same 
as "posse;:;;sion'' in the statute, but presents an alternate 
way in which its requirements might be met. 
Thus, \Ve respectfully suggest that where the right 
to continuous use over a substantial period of time is 
gained by a lessee under lease or contract, a sales tax 
may be applied to such lease or contract according to the 
~tatutory language. One of the witnesses for plaintiff 
at the hearing, Mr. Joseph S. Francom, said (R. 54) that 
the companies "leased the privilege to use " the billboards 
"for three or four years." If the court finds that l\lr. 
:B'rancom's representation is accurate, the statutory re-
quirements are met. 
At the risk of being redundant we note once more 
at this juncture that the court need not sustain the finding 
of the Commission that Snarr's clients had a right to 
continuous possession and the finding that these custo-
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rners had a right to continuous use, since, in the alterna-
tive, either would be sufficient to create tax liability. 
Both are present, however. 
A somewhat troublesome phrase in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-15-2(g) (1963) is that which reads "such transfer 
of possession.'' This language seemingly demands an. 
antecedent, yet there is no antecedent, no mention in the 
statutes of a transfer to which it could refer back. There 
is some judicial authority to the effect that where posses-
sion is involved there must be a "transfer" of such pos-
Sf'ssion before a tax may lie. It should be noted, however, 
that the transfer need not be a physical handover akin to 
livery of seisen. An exchange of papers or even a verbal 
act is often sufficient to accomplish such a transfer; 
actual physical possession may not even he a significant 
factor. See Browne v. Case, Pomeroy & Co., 47 N.Y.S. 2d 
547, 267 App. Div. 496 (19-14); Lehman v. Cameron, 139 
N.Y.S. 2d 812, 207 Misc. 919 (1955). 
The point of transfer of po session m the instant 
ease would be that point at which a billboard was erected 
and its utilization for the exclusive benefit of the custo-
mer in question began. This would be the proper moment 
for tax imposition. 
In the context of a "right'' to use rather than a 
"right" to possess, the phrase "such transfer of posses-
sion" presents a particularly difficult interpretive prob-
lem. Since we have determined that the requirements of 
the statute may be met by a contractual right to use the 
property as \vell as a contractual right to possess the 
property, this phrase might be properly read "transfer 
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of possL'ssion or use., or "transfer of possession or com-
mencement of use." Or it might be interpreted to define 
the moment of proper imposition when a pussessory 
right is to be taxed. Further insight into the ''transfor" 
requirellwnt in a context of use i·athPr than possession 
comes from the use tax law equivalent of Utah Code Ann. 
~ 59-15-2(g) (1963), which is Utah Code Ann.~ 59-16-2(k) 
(1963): 
\Vhen the right to eontinnons 1>ossession or use 
of an artiele of tangible personal i>ro1wrty is 
granted undL'r a lf•asP or contraet, such lease or 
contract shall be considf•recl thP storaw', use or 
other consumption of such article and the tax 
shall be computed and paid upon the rentals pai(l. 
The absenct> of a requin•rnent of a transfrr in this 
provision suggests that where a taxable right of use 
is involved, no transfer requirement exists. Bolstering 
this conclusion are the holdings of our court to the effect 
that our sales and use tax ach; are in pari materia and 
that tht> prnvisions of one appl~- to the other as well. 
See Barrett Ini:cstnient Co. 1). State Tax Cornm'n, 15 
Utah 2d 97, 387 P. 2d 998 (19G-1-). 
Refert'nce to Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-16-2(k) (19G3) 
opens another interesting dimension of this problem. 
Our use tax law contains an exemption for transaction;.; 
subject to a Utah sales ta.._ [rtah Code Ann.~ 59-1G-4(d) 
(1963)]. If the court should find that ewry n•quirement 
of Utah Code Ann.~ 59-15-2(g) (19G:3) is met except that 
of a "transfer of i>ossession" and that the transactions 
are therefore not subject to a sales tax, rTtah Code Ann. 
~ 59-16--1-(d) (19G3) would lw inapplicable. Use tax li-
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ability would lie under the terms of Utah Code Ann. 
~ 59-16-2(k) (1963). 
Another phrase in Utah Code Ann.§ 59-15-2(g) (1963) 
meriting our consideration reads "would be taxable if an 
outright sale were made." In consideration of this re-
quirement, a question should be sufficient: If Snarr had 
sold outright to a client a painted billboard, would a sales 
tax lie upon the full price of such sale~ We would submit 
that the answer to this question is so obviously affirma-
tive as to require no further discussion or exploration. 
The final clause of Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g) 
( 1963) sets forth unequivocally that the amounts of 
rentals paid to the lessor shall be the basis of the excise 
tax imposed. This, in addition to defining the rate of 
tax, argues against the proration between materials and 
services where no breakdown is made in the agreements 
between Snarr and its clients. 
Courts throughout the country in construing statu-
tory language related to (but sometimes distinguishable 
from) Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(g) (1963) have arrived 
at diverse conclusions. One of the most oft-cited cases 
in this area, and one which was explored at some length 
in plaintiff's brief, is Universal Engineering Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 256 P. 2d 1059 (Cal. 1953). This 
case is the source of the influential "substantial consump-
tion" test. It involved rock bits used in drilling, and held 
that when these bits had been used by the lessee in such 
manner and to such extent that they were not fit for 
reuse, a sales tax was appropriately applied. If this 
concept were to be applied in the instant context, it is 
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respectfully uTged that a tax woul<l usually lie, since 
the signs are custom-made, often cut in unusual designs, 
and used for the exclusive benefit of a single customer 
for a period of several years. Testimony was introduced 
to the effect that parts of signs were on orcasion reused, 
even though the witness was not able to offer any mean-
ingful estimate as to the amounts reused. 
'y ere the court to adopt this test or something akin 
thereto dt~tailed factual determinations might have to be 
made by the advertising agenri<>s to determine which 
parts of the billboards \\'ere in fact used in more than 
one display. It seems clear that any materials used 
solely in the display of one client for his lwnefit and not 
reused at the end of the period of the lease agreement 
are "substantially consumed'' during the course of the 
lease transaction. 
Another case r01ied upon by plaintiff is Federal Sign 
& Signal Corp. v. Bowers, 174 N.E. 2d 91 (Ohio 1961). 
This would seem on initial impression to he of particular 
usefulness since it involves billboanl ]Pases. EvPn though 
the factual situations are in fact similar, it is respeetfnll)" 
submitted that the case is readily distinguishable on the 
basis of law. The Ohio statntf•, as poinkd out on ]lRges 
22-23 of plaintiff's brief, requires transfer of possession 
or title, whc•reas the Utah provision is concerned solely 
with a lease or contract which creates the right to pos-
session or use. We would, thus, respectfully suggest that 
the difference in statutory language involved is of such 
significance that the case loses whatever 1wrsuasive foree 
the factual similarities appear to give it. 
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Other cases not previously mentioned herein or in 
plaintiff's brief in which tax imposition was upheld are 
Recording Devices, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 
190 N.E. 2d 258 (1963) "\vhich involved time lock rentals; 
Poston Equip. Corp. v. Bowers, 171 N.E. 2d 725 (Ohio 
1959) which dealt with construction equipment; Phila-
delphia Assoc. Linen Supply v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. 
Supr. 560, 12 Atl. 2d 789 (19-±0) in which a tax was 
imposed on linen rentals. Contra: Fe.derhofer Inc. v. 
Morris, 364 S.W. 2d 523 (Mo. 1963) involving vehicle 
rentals and IBM v. State Tax Comm'n, 362 S.W. 2d 635 
(::\fo. 1962) dealing with the lease of business machines. 
Pursuit of the case law and literature in this field 
leads to two conclusions: ( 1) There is such variance 
in the statutory language from state to state that both 
the cases holding both for and against imposition are, 
as previously pointed out, limited in the persuasive value 
they have; and (2) with the passage of time there is an 
increasingly broader imposition of ta.-x. in situations which 
seem to have little relationship to the classic "sales in 
disguise" or "lease in lieu of sale" situation in which 
this type of statute had its birth. 
-we now invite the court's attention to the most sig-
nificant judicial precedent, the case of Y owng Electric 
Sign Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra. Young Electric 
Sign Company (hereinafter referred to as "Young") 
entered into agreements under the terms of which neon 
signs were furnished to clients at a fixed monthly rental 
for an extended period. The worth of the materials in 
such signs came to something less than fifty percent of 
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tbe rental under the terms of the agreements. This comt 
found in the clients of Young the right to possession or 
use of these neon signs, even though formal title to them 
remained in Young and even though Young was obligated 
under terms of the contracts to perfonn maintenance and 
repair services on these signs. 'Vhile there was some 
variance between the language in the agreements involved 
in the Young case and those herein involved, it is respect-
fully submitted that the two transactions are substan-
tially identical. The court said after reciting the facts 
(most of which were stipulated) and quoting Utah Code 
Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) (1963): 
This statute is not amhiguous. It is not contro-
verted that the transfer of poss<•ssion of the signs 
under the rental contracts here involved are such 
that if outright salt's were made they 'rnuld he 
taxable under this section. In suf'h event the 
plain wording of the statute requires the taxes 
to be computed npon tlw rentals paid. What elP-
ments enter into the charges for these rentals can 
be of no materialit_\' . .f Utah 2d 20G, 291 P. 2d 902. 
The similarity of the two cases, and the remarkable 
similarity between the arguments raised by Young and 
those now being urged upon the eonrt by Snarr, is illus-
trated in this language from the opinion: 
Plaintiffs argue that from these stipulations it 
appean; that although tlW_\' used a rental agree-
ment form in their re-writes, thP.\- in faet werp 
not renting personal property in such re-writes 
the "possession of which wonld be taxable if an 
outright sale were made>," but WPr<' actually selling 
service and maintenance contraets and that the 
same was true of tlH~ charges for tlw options. 
While it is true that in detern1ining these rentals 
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and option prices the plaintiffs did not charge for 
the value of the sign, nevertheless they retained 
the title to the sign and were still renting it to 
the customer ... The material fact is that there 
is transferred the right to continuous possession 
of personal property the possession of which 
under a contract or lease would be taxable if an 
outright sale ·were made, and as we pointed out 
in the case of the original rental agreements, it is 
the charges for these agreements which are tax-
able and not the various elements which enter 
into the determination of these charges. -± l~tah 2d 
206, 291 P. 2d 903. 
It is true that the present problem represents an 
extension of the Young holding. ·we would respectfully 
submit, however, that it is not an unwarranted extension, 
but one which follows logically and inevitably from the 
thrust of the Young opinion. The similarities between 
the two situations are far more numerous and far more 
significant than the differences between them. These 
latter include agreement nomenclature, the utilization of 
the signs in the Young case for both identification and 
advertising purposes, and the usual location of the signs 
in the Young case on or near the business premises of 
the customer. There has been considerable previous com-
ment about the significance of agreement nomenclature 
as opposed to transaction substance. There would appear 
to be no significant difference within the purview of the 
statutory language in the use or benefit received by a 
client between having his place of business identified or 
in having his product advertised, if indeed this type 
of precise distinction can be made. This leaves the ques-
tion of the locations of the signs. On page 21 of its 
brief, Snarr suggests (raising the point for the first 
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time on this appeal) that a trespass might be here in-
volved were the client to even go to his sign. VVe would 
respectfully submit that even if this is true that it does 
not go to the substance of the type of the right to pos-
session or use contemplated by the Legislature, and fur-
ther that the requirement is still met, even though less 
obviously than in the Y oun,q case. This is particularly 
true in view of the Commission's finding that plaintiff's 
clients possessed the right of continuous use of the struc-
tures involved. 
POINT III 
THE TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN 
SNARR ADVERTISING, INC. AND ITS CUSTOl\IERS 
ARE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE LIMITS OF 
SALES TAX IMPOSITION, AND THE TAX WAS 
PROPERLY IMPOSED. 
The first two points of this brief consist of an analy-
sis of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2 ( g) ( 1963). This third 
and final point is in the nature of a miscellany; herein, 
an attempt to respond to arguments made in plaintiff's 
brief outside of the gamut of the statutory language will 
be made, and the problem will be explored in a somewhat 
broader frame of reference. 
Plaintiff has placed considerable reliance on the 
fact that only in recent years has the Tax Commission 
attempted to assert that billboard rentals were appro-
priate subjects for taxation. This would appear to be 
true, and the stipulation itself contains the statement that 
there is no evidence that anv such assertion was made 
prior to August 1963. There are a number of possible 
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explanations, such as a change in industry practice, the 
discovery by Tax Commission officials and auditors of 
taxes which should have been paid, and, most signifi-
cantly, the Young Electric Sign decision. Certainly there 
is no suggestion in the record that the Commission ever 
vrior to this time made a specific determination that 
sales tax was not due upon the right of possession or use 
of painted billboards. It might be well argued that these 
proceedings result not from the change in position, but 
rather the initial taking of a position in an attempt on 
the part of the Commission to secure a more thorough 
and equitable enforcement of the law. The record shows 
a prior Commission position neither consistent nor incon-
sistent with its present stand; it simply shows no prior 
position at all. 
I£ven if the court finds that the Commission has been 
wrong in its failure to more diligently enforce this provi-
sion of the law in this factual context, no estoppel or 
prohibition against imposition at this point is created. 
This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed by this 
court, most recently in the case of Union Pacific R.R. Co. 
v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah,-------- Utah 2d ________ , --------
p. 2d -·-····· ( 1967). The court therein stated : 
The plaintiff makes another argument to which 
we dirE>ct our attention. It says that for 22 years 
the defendant Tax Commission has interpreted the 
statute so as to exempt railroads from paying a 
sales or use tax on its fuel oil used in propelling 
its engines and that many legislatures have been 
convened during that period of time, but never 
once has a bill been introduced to change the 
statute as so interpreted. The general law is found 
in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Section 358, at page 759: 
39 
On the vrintiple of eontc•n111o:·anr•nn~: <·xpo8ition, 
eomrnon usage and lll'adi<'e nml•·r t1H• statnh-, or 
a eom·se of comlnct ind iea tinµ; n l H: ·\-i en] a 1· under-
standing of it, will frpqnc•ntJ,· 1w of' gl'eat vahw 
in determining its real mea11i11µ;, <'S]J(·cialJ:,' '.d1en 
thl' usage has heen a('qni<·~:eed in h~" all part ie:-: 
coneerned, and has Pxtenc1ed over a long period 
of time. A praetical construction of a statute is 
not conclusive on the courts, hut, if unvarying 
for a long period of time, it should be disregarded 
only for the most cog·ent reasons. rrhe doctrine 
arises only from a course of conduct, and is nev<'r 
applied to a single case. l\f oreover, no matter lww 
long the usage has bel'n Pstabllslwd, or how gen-
eral the acquiescence in the customary eonstl'll('-
tion, it will not be permitted to override the plain 
meaning of a statute: nor will the rule of prac-
tical construction apply where the ambiguity is 
merely captious and not serious enough to raisP 
a reasonable doubt in a fair mind reflecting 
honestly on the sub;ject. 
One of the many earlier cases standing for the same 
proposition, and one which states it ·with particular terse-
ness, is E. C. Olson Co. v. State Tax Cmnm'n, 109 Utah 
563, 168 P. 2d 324 ( 1946). '11he eourt nokd: 
vVe find no merit in the plaintiff's contention 
that the Tax Commission is precluded from col-
leeting the tax defieieney heeausc' of Commission 
auditor's oral statements that the sal0s were not 
subjeet to the tax and b0eause the C01mnission 
has not attempted to eollect same for over 1:2 
years . 
. . . Nor is it shown that the Commission aetnally 
knew taxes ·wen>. not being paid on said sales 
and so could he said to havt> acqnieseed in t]JI' 
non-collection thereof. 
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... lt will not be seriously contended that be-
cause the Tax Commission has for so many years 
omitted to assess and collect the tax on the ques-
tioned sales it is now precluded from performing 
that duty and from salvaging from its past omis-
sions what it can for the state. 
Plaintiff's memorandum. cites two regulations of the 
State Ta."'\: Commission which are germane to the instant 
problem. Sales Tax Regulation No. 32 is excerpted in 
plaintiff's brief hut for convenient reference the relevant 
portion is here reprinted in full: 
Sales or use tax shall be computed by the lessor 
on rentals received pursuant to rental or lease 
agreements which are made in lieu of outright 
sales. In cases where the lessor is not registered 
with the tax commission to collect use tax, the tax 
must be paid directly to the tax commission by 
the lessee of the tangible personal property. 
Tax on receipts from leases and rentals applies 
when the lessee has the right to use and operate 
the tangible personal property. ·where the lessor 
has a renting and leasing business and he pur-
chases tangible personal property for rental or 
lease purposes, he should issue his vendor a resale 
certificate because, in this category, the tax is 
applicable only on the rentals charged and not 
on the cost of the property to the lessor. 
Sales Tax Regulation No. G5 is quoted in pertinent 
part on page 16 of plaintiff's brief. 
It is urged by plaintiff that these regulations are 
not completely ronsistent with the stand now taken by 
the Commission. 
Sales Tax Regulation No. 32 rephrases slightly the 
statutory language but does not, nor indeed cannot, mod-
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ify its meaning in any pai·ticular. 'Chat part going beyond 
the statutory language deals primarily with the mechanics 
of computation and collection. 
Sales Tax Regulation No. 65 is not applicable to 
painted billboards for the reasons pointed out in Point I 
of this brief. The artwork reforred to is artwork created 
in the office of the advertising agency for visualization 
and selection purposes, rather than a finalized IJainted 
billboard to be placed before the public. 
In case the court does determine, however, that 
these regulations are not consistent with statutory law, 
it is axiomatic that the statutes and not the regulation 
must control. A regulation must be interpreted in a 
manner consistent ·with the statute upon which it is based 
to have any validity; if irreconcilable with that statuh•, 
it may simply be ignored. In Olson Construction Co. L 
State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P. 2d 1112 (1961), 
the Utah Supreme Court said of a regulation which had 
been promulgated and later withdrawn by the State Tax 
Commission: 
The regulation went hP)rond penuissihle lilllits of 
administrative intc~rprdation since it would, on 
the facts of this case, nullify tlw applieahle statn-
tory definitions of the terms ''r<-'tail salt>" and 
"retailer" and would grant an exem1)tion ·where 
the statutes grant none. This court, while n'cog-
nizing the possibility that one might lw pe1rnliz('d 
by reliance upon an invalid administrative regula-
tion, has held that an administrativP intPqn·c,ta-
tion out of harmon)r nnd contrary to th(' t'xpn:ss 
provisions of a statute eannot lw givPn weight and, 
to do so, would in effect amend that statute. 
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On pages 28-29 of its brief, Snarr points out that 
some tax has been paid upon the materials utilized in 
these billboards. It suggests that to now impose a tax 
upon the finished product would amount to double ta.xa-
ti on necessitating a refund. If the court's decision is 
that the position of the Tax Commission is sound, this 
claim would seem meritorious and an appropriate refund 
would be forthwith tendered. This would appear to be a 
red herring, however, since the tax paid by plaintiff's 
own calculation amounts to only about five percent of 
the total deficiency assessment. Further, plaintiff has 
not yet petitioned the Commission for a refund of such 
tax, but is in fact raising this argument for the first 
point at thiR stage of the proceedings. If the decision 
of this court, or an equitable extension of this decision, 
requires a refund or credit, this should present no prob-
lem. 
Finally, plaintiff notes on page 17 of its brief the 
maxim that ambiguous tax measures should be construed 
strictly against the taxing authority. In addition to mak-
ing the assumption (expressly contradicted in the Young 
decision) that the statute herein involved is ambiguous, 
this fails to state the principle of law that a party 
;;:eeking exemption from a revenue statute of general im-
position has the burden to show that he is entitled 
thereto and that statutes of this type must be construed 
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power. 
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 24 L.Ed. 558, 560 
(1878), Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pac. 1097 
(1897); Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272; 
12 A.L.R. 552 (1920). Both of these maxims have in the 
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past somewhat regrettably been utilized as convenient 
pegs for courts to hang de>cisions on ,,-hi<'h hav<:'. usnall~; 
been made on other bases altogether, but both are none-
theless valid statements of the law. "Which, if either, is 
here appropriate will depend upon the court's interpre-
tation of the particular facts involved. At least one case, 
Recording Devices, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, stands for the 
proposition that the presumption favors the State and 
the burden is on the taxpayer. 
CONCLUSION 
Snarr Advertising, Inc. is engaged m the business 
of preparing painted billboards containing advertising 
matter which are erected on various sites for the benefit 
of its customers whose goods or services are being adver-
tised. There are no poster billboards, which may present 
different legal considerations, involved in this proceed-
mg. 
These billboards are tangible personal property 
within the purview of Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-15-2(g) 
(1963). The Commission determination on this point was 
based upon and is in c0mplete aceord with the ruling of 
this court in the case of M cK cndrick v. State Tax 
Comm'n, supra. 
The Utah State Tax Commission in its capacity as a 
finder of fact, after a long and careful consideration of 
the evidence presented before it, determined that the 
customers of Snarr obtained under the documents herein 
involved the right to continuous possl'Ssion of th(•se hill-
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boards according to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 59-
15-2 ( g) ( 1963). 
The Commission also determined that the clients 
of Snarr obtained the right of continuous use of these 
billboards. 
The statutory requirement for tax imposition is in 
tlie alternative and to affirm the Commission's decision 
the court need find only that either the right to contin-
uous possession or the right to continuous use existed 
in these customers of Snarr. 
The evidence also indicates an actual continuous 
possession and an actual continuous use of the properties 
involved by the customers of Snarr; however, the exist-
ence of such possession or use is not a statutory require-
ment. 
It is respectfully submitted that the remainder of the 
requirements of the statute are also met, and that if an 
outright sale of the billboards were made the transaction 
would be taxable. This being the case, the statutory 
language is explicit that tax shall be computed and paid 
by the vendor or lessor upon the amount of these rentals. 
If the court finds all of the requirements of the 
statute met, except that relating to a transfer of posses-
sion (if appropriate), the transactions are within the 
purview of Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-2(k) (1963), and 
subject to the Utah use tax. 
It is respectfully urged that the fact situation in this 
('ase is in substance identical to that in the case of Young 
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P.:lcctric Sign Co., supra, and that case constitntt•s a com-
pelling and controlling precedent for taxation. 
The questions presented in this case are significant 
and will have an effect upon the outdoor advertising 
industry in this State however resolvt•<l h:- the tourt. 
The decision of the Commission was fair, equitable and 
in accordance with applicable Utah law and \\·e respeet-
fully urge that it be affirmed. 
Respedfully snbrni tted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attornc•y General 
"Thf. REED HlTNTT:DR 
Assistant Attorne:- General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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